A prominent issue in the debates over faculty involvement in university licensing is whether financial incentives associated with licensing have diverted faculty from basic toward applied research (Stephan and Levin 1996) . Available evidence is limited and provides mixed results. Lach and Schankerman (2003) provide empirical support for the view that invention activity, as measured by invention disclosures, is positively related to the share of license income accruing to faculty.
1 Thursby (2002, 2007) provide support for the view that increased disclosure activity is more reflective of an increased willingness of faculty to engage in commercial activity than a change in research profile. Their study of faculty in six major research universities shows that over the last two decades, the probability a faculty member will disclose an invention has increased tenfold, while research productivity has remained roughly constant. In essence, despite the importance of the issue, we know little about the effect of faculty involvement in licensing on the nature of research.
In this paper, we construct several life cycle models of faculty behavior that allow us to examine this and related issues. In the models we consider, the faculty member faces a fixed teaching load and chooses the amount of time to devote to research (which can be either basic or applied) and the amount of time to take as leisure. We model both the puzzle solving and financial motives for the faculty member to conduct research, and we consider her behavior with and without the possibility of licensing. This allows us to examine the effect of licensing on the research mix, as well as the total amount of time working, throughout the life cycle. We also examine the effect of the tenure decision on the type of research conducted with and without the possibility of licensing.
We show that, with or without licensing, and with or without a tenure system, the faculty member devotes more time to research early in her career, so that leisure rises over time. In that sense, licensing does not alter the life cycle pattern. We show that there are, nonetheless, real effects of licensing since it yields a higher ratio of applied to basic effort and lower leisure throughout the life cycle. Thus, as suggested by Lach and Schankerman (2003) , faculty respond to economic incentives Importantly, however, this diversion does not mean that research is compromised. In our models, leisure is the activity most compromised, so that total research effort rises; and in most of the models we consider, basic effort rises with the introduction of licensing.
The implications of licensing for research output and the stock of knowledge depend, not only on the effect on applied and basic effort but also on whether applied effort contributes to the stock of knowledge. We show that the worst case scenario is where the applied effort involved with licensing is pure development and adds nothing to the stock of knowledge. If, however, the applied effort involved in licensing leads to publishable output as well as licenses, then the outlook is more favorable. In this case, we show that research output and the stock of knowledge are generally higher with licensing than without. The exception to this is when a tenure system is in place and the incentives to license are very high.
In Section 1, we discuss prior work in this area and how this paper contributes. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 presents life cycle behavior for three different scenarios: a development model in which only basic effort contributes to the stock of knowledge; a complements model in which basic and applied efforts are complements in the production of both research and licenses; and a model in which basic and applied effort are substitutes in research production. Section 4 presents results when tenure is introduced to the model, and Section 5 concludes.
Prior Art
This research is related to prior work in the economics of science, life cycle behavior, and university-industry technology transfer. While several studies in these areas examine faculty research, their relevance to the current debates is limited since all but a few abstract from licensing.
The Economics of Science
Recent work in the economics of science focuses on the economic implications of scientific reward systems. In her recent survey, Stephan (1996) points out that this work owes much to sociologists and historians of science for demonstrating the importance scientists attach to solving puzzles and to being the "first" to solve them (Hagstrom 1965 , Kuhn 1970 , and Merton 1957 . Levin and Stephan (1991) incorporate the love of puzzle-solving into a life-cycle model in which scientists choose how to split work effort between research and other income-earning activities. A "taste" for science also plays a major role in Stern's (2004) empirical analysis of wages offered to Ph.D. biologists. David (1987, 1994) focus on the efficiency aspects of a "priority-based" system in which all rewards go to the first to discover a result. While this system results in duplication of research and multiple discoveries Maskin 1987, Merton 1973) , it also creates incentives for scientists to share information freely and quickly. This is in contrast to the industrial world where there are strong incentives to restrict the flow of knowledge. As scientists become more entrepreneurial, it is natural to wonder if science will suffer (Dasgupta and David 1987 , Nelson 1992 , and Stephan and Levin 1996 .
The study most relevant to ours is that of Levin and Stephan (1991) . In their model, scientists engage in research for two reasons: their love of puzzle solving and as an investment in future earnings. While the investment motive declines over the life cycle, the utility or joy from solving puzzles does not. In their model, research productivity at any stage is higher the greater a scientist's "taste" for research, and while research productivity declines over the life cycle, the profile is flatter the greater the taste for science.
We construct a life cycle model that is similar in that faculty derive utility from research but differs in the types of research that can be done and the financial rewards to research. In Levin and Stephan, faculty earn a university salary which at any point in time is positively related to the portion of time spent teaching and the stock of publications. Thus, time spent on research reduces current earnings but increases future earnings as in other investment models of human capital. By contrast, we allow research to increase both current and future earnings as in "experience" models of human capital in which individuals accumulate knowledge in their time spent working. Moreover, faculty can do either (or both) basic and applied research, and when research has an applied component, faculty earn license income. 
University-Industry Technology Transfer
Empirical evidence on university-industry interaction and faculty research is mixed both in focus and results. Some studies suggest that applied research increased in the post Bayh-Dole era (Cohen et al. 1998 , Morgan et al. 1997 , Rahm 1994 while others point to a long history of such research (Mowery and Ziedonis 2002 , Mowery et al. 1999 , Rosenberg and Nelson 1994 . Cohen et al.'s (1998) survey of university-industry research centers (UIRCs) provides evidence of countervailing effects of industry collaboration on faculty productivity, with so-called commercial outputs of research increasing and publications decreasing (except in biotechnology). Given the importance of publications for industrial productivity (Adams 1990 ), these results are cause for concern. By contrast, Mansfield (1995) , Zucker et al. (1994 Zucker et al. ( , 1998 , Stephan et al. (2003) , and Murray (2002) find a complementary relationship between research productivity and commercial activity. Mansfield's (1995) study of 321 academic researchers found that faculty frequently worked on basic problems suggested by their industrial consulting. Similarly, Zucker et al. (1994 Zucker et al. ( , 1998 found that the most productive scientists in biotechnology often start new enterprises while continuing research in their academic appointments. In the case of tissue engineering, Stephan et al. (2003) and Murray (2002) examine patent and publication data showing that research results are both patented and published.
The bulk of this literature abstracts from the relationship between licensing and faculty research. Not surprisingly, however, the few studies that focus on licensing also provide mixed results. Lach and Schankerman (2002) find a positive relationship between invention disclosures and the share of license revenue accruing to inventors. While they interpret this as showing the responsiveness of research to financial incentives associated with licensing, we argue that disclosures show the faculty's willingness to engage in licensing and may or may not reflect changes in research agendas. examine whether the growth in university licensing is driven by an unobservable change in the propensity of faculty and administrators to engage in license activity. They find that changes in the direction of research are relatively less important than increases in the propensity of administrators to license inventions and in business reliance on external R&D. However, these data are not at the level of the individual scientist, but rather research outputs at the university level.
The study most closely related is Thursby and Thursby (2007) which examines the research profiles of 3,241 faculty from six major US universities from 1983 through 1999. They find that while the probability a faculty member will disclose an invention increased tenfold over this period, the portion of research that is published in "basic" journals remained constant. They also find that both publications and disclosure activity rise and then fall with age (with publications peaking before disclosure). These results suggest that understanding the relationship between faculty research and licensing requires an understanding, not only of financial incentives, but also life cycle behavior.
There is little theoretical research on the financial incentives facing faculty and the allocation of effort across types of research. Beath et al. (2003) and Jensen and Thursby (2004) both examine faculty research incentives in a principal agent context where the university is the principal and the faculty member the agent. Beath et al.'s (2003) analysis is static and examines the potential for the university to ease its budget constraint by allowing faculty to conduct applied research on a consulting basis. By contrast, Jensen and Thursby's (2004) model is dynamic and provides an analysis of the effect of patent licensing on research and the quality of education, where the latter effect is a function of research choices (and hence future stocks of knowledge) as well as the portion of patentable knowledge that can be used in education. Given their emphasis on the education problem, they abstract from life cycle patterns. Their work is similar to ours since the faculty they model derive utility simply from the time spent doing the research as well as the prestige associated with successful research. They show that with these effects in the researcher's choice problem, the opportunity to earn license income may well not change his/her research agenda, which of course provides one explanation for why we might observe little change in the pattern of basic relative to applied publications.
Basic Model
In this Section, we consider the research profile of an individual faculty member over the life cycle. In our model, the faculty member can engage in applied and/or basic research and can earn income both as current salary and license income. Both types of research have consumption value and both contribute to current and future income since research, as well as teaching, is rewarded in salary. Thus, as in Levin and Stephan (1991) , there is a consumption motive for research that does not decline over the life cycle and a financial motive that does. In our case, however, there is an additional financial motive for applied research, which does not decline over the life cycle. Applied work that is licensed provides a future income stream that continues regardless of work effort.
In general, we think of a faculty member choosing across four activities at any time t: teaching, h t , basic research, b t , applied research, a t , and leisure, n t . We assume the hours devoted to teaching are determined by a fixed teaching load, so that we consider the effective time constraint as 100 = b t + a t + n t . The faculty member's objective is to maximize utility over her career, which begins at time 0 (receipt of PhD) and ends at retirement, T . Utility, U t , is a function of research output, R t (this is the love of problem solving), market goods, X t , leisure, n t , and the net present value of assets at retirement, V (A T ). The faculty member's problem is to choose b t , a t , X t , n t , and A T to maximize
where ρ > 0, U(·) and V (·) are assumed to be twice differentiable and strictly concave in their arguments. In it's most general form, research output is a function of time spent on basic and/or applied research, as well as the individual's knowledge stock K t .
The knowledge base, K t , increases with R t , and, while knowledge doesn't diminish with time, its relevance for current research does, so that changes in the stock of relevant knowledge is given by
where δ is the depreciation rate. Salary is, in part, remuneration for teaching (assumed equal for all individuals and all t). Faculty members are also compensated for research (all of which we assume is publishable). Here we assume that salary is not determined simply by current research, but also the output from past research that is still useful in research. Her current salary is then given by
where H t represents income from teaching and r is the rental rate on the stock of knowledge (that is, relevant publications). Under Bayh-Dole, research can also lead to license income. The faculty member can also earn license income, which is a function of licenses generated by her work and her share of the university's income from these licenses. While, in general, licenses can be based on either basic or applied research, recent survey evidence suggests that most embryonic inventions require further development for commercial success Thursby 2001) . For the moment, we abstract from development effort (which would not be publishable) and assume that, in general, licensable output, L t , is a function of time spent on applied and basic research, as well as the stock of knowledge.
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The change in financial assets over time is given by
where p is the (constant) price of market goods and i is the interest rate, and
is the net present value of licensable output at time t. There is no uncertainty in the model so the net present value of licensable output, V t , is known and s is the inventor's share of license revenue. We assume that capital markets are perfect so that the faculty member's license income can be cashed in at t.
Licensing versus No Licensing Simulations
The system is sufficiently complex that we resort to simulations to characterize the time paths of research efforts and productivity. To simplify, we follow Ryder et al. (1976) in assuming ρ = i = 0 so that life cycle earnings are spread evenly over the life cycle. We set current consumption X t = 100 and the initial value of K 0 = 1. The utility function is one commonly used in life cycle models:
where
For the research production function, we pick a form that allows us to incorporate the notion that applied work may indeed improve the productivity of basic research effort:
where γ i ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, 3) and ϕ is either 0 and 1. When ϕ = 1, the production function is purely multiplicative and allows for the complementarity of applied and basic work observed by Mansfield (1995) and Zucker et.al (1994 Zucker et.al ( , 1998 . When ϕ = 0 it is additive so that applied and basic research are substitutes(as implied by Cohen et al. (1994) ). The additive form allows the faculty member to specialize in either type of research, but precludes complementarity.
In the most general case, we also allow basic and applied effort to directly lead to licenses as well as publications:
where α i ≥ 0 (i = 1, 2, 3). This form loosely captures the notion that inventions licensed require further development since some applied effort is always necessary in order to produce licenses. While basic effort in period t is not necessary for period t license output, for α 2 > 0 it will have a direct effect on license output in addition to the indirect effect through the stock of knowledge. By allowing complementarity of basic and applied effort in both research and licensing, we allow for the much discussed case of research in Pasteur's Quadrant where curiosity driven research has immediate commercial applications. We solve the system for R t , A t , L t , K t , a t , b t , and n t (where n t = 100 − a t − b t ) for given values of the utility and production function parameters ϕ, θ i (i = 1, 2, 3), γ i (i = 1, 2, 3), α i (i = 1, 2, 3), the rate of depreciation of the knowledge base, δ, and the share of licensing income that accrues to the researcher, s. All parameters are non-negative. Without loss of generality we set T = 30. For each combination of parameters we solve the system and record the values of the variables R t , L t , K t , a t , b t , and n t at periods t = 1, 2, ..., 30. Thus, while the system is continuous, we only examine it at 30 points over the life-cycle beginning with the first period (one period after the start of employment as a faculty member) and ending with the final period (the beginning of retirement).
To answer the basic question of how licensing affects faculty choices and resulting outputs, we compare life cycle behavior when licensing is not rewarded (s = 0) with the pattern when s > 0. We do this for a large set of parameter values and for different variations of the production functions. Results are presented for parameter combinations from the sets δ = (0.2, 0.4), γ 3 = (0.2, 0.3), γ 1 = (0.0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5), and γ 2 = (0.25, 0.4, 0.5, 0.75) where γ 1 < γ 2 . Early runs indicated that qualitative results on life-cycle behavior varied little over the parameters of the utility function thus we use only single values for the θ i (θ 1 = θ 2 = 0.25 and θ 3 = 0.5).
3 In the non-licensing regime all α i = 0 and s = 0. In the licensing regime we use parameter combinations from the sets s = (0.25, 0.5, 0.7), α 1 = (0.4, 0.6, 0.8), α 2 = (0.0, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5) where α 1 > α 2 and α 3 = (0.25, 0.4, 0.6). While the system does not converge for all parameter combinations, it does for a large number. Since behavior clearly depends on parameter values, we present results based on averages across parameter combinations.
In Sections 3.1−3.2, we present results for three production functions of interest. As a benchmark, Section 3.1 considers results for a model that, without licensing, is similar to Levin and Stephan's life cycle model. In this model, there is a single type of research that is publishable (i.e, ϕ = 1, and γ 1 = 0) and when licensing is possible, license output only requires applied effort (which is not publishable) but yields license income (i.e., α 2 = 0 and s > 0). Section 3.2 presents results for the case where applied and basic research are complements in both the research and licensing production functions (φ = 1 and all α i and γ i are positive). Section 3.3 presents the case where applied and basic effort are substitutes in the production of research.
Development Model
In this section, we consider the behavior of a faculty member who maximizes life cycle utility given by (7) when research and licensing production are given by
and
Intuitively, we would expect this model to provide the bleakest view of the effect of licensing since the applied effort necessary for licensing does not contribute to the knowledge base. For this reason we refer to this as the "development model." To the extent that the financial return to licensing diverts faculty from basic to applied work, the stream of research suffers. It is not clear how much work effort will be diverted, however, because applied work provides only license income while basic effort provides utility and income. Figure 1 plots the average values of applied and basic effort across parameter combinations when licensing is not rewarded (s = 0) and when it is (s > 0). In this case, there are no returns to licensing (pecuniary or nonpecuniary) when s = 0, so a t is zero in every period. Results of note are:
1. When licensing is rewarded, some effort is diverted to applied work in every period and this effort increases throughout the life cycle. This, of course, follows from the fact that returns to research output end at period T while licensing output gives returns beyond T .
2. With licensing, basic effort exceeds applied effort early and late in the life cycle, though the effect is quite small on average. In the middle of the career, however, basic effort with licensing falls below that without licensing. By the end of the career, basic effort (and hence research output) falls toward zero in the absence of licensing, while with licensing, basic effort decreases but remains positive throughout the life cycle. This occurs because of the indirect effect of basic effort on license output through the stock of knowledge. Thus the financial return to license output increases basic as well as applied effort toward the end of the life cycle (relative to a regime without licensing).
3. Leisure can be inferred from the combined plots for a t and b t , and is given in Figure 2 . In both the licensing and non-licensing regimes, leisure activity increases over the life-cycle. Since the ability to license increases applied effort and reduces basic effort over some periods, whether licensing increases or decreases leisure depends on the relative effects. For the parameter values we consider, the net effect of the second source of income on leisure is always negative; faculty always work more in a licensing regime though the split of effort between basic and applied is affected.
4. As in Levin and Stephan (1991) , research output and the stock of knowledge initially increase but eventually decrease as a result of the decrease in basic effort over time. As shown in Figure 3 , research output is generally lower with than without licensing. Only at the very beginning and very end of a career does the presence of licensing increase research output R. This, of course, follows from the fact that basic effort (which is the only effort that adds to the stock of knowledge in this case) early and late in a career is higher with than without licensing. It is important to note, however, that comparisons of the levels of research output and the stock of knowledge (as opposed to the shape of the plots) are dependent on the parameter values considered and we present only averages over a number of parameter combinations. 5. In Figure 4 we plot the level of licensing output when s > 0 (licensing output is, of course, always zero when s = 0). Interestingly, L rises throughout a career until the very last periods. Recall that basic effort in this model does not directly enter the licensing production function, though it does enter through its effect on the stock of knowledge K. Thus, the fall in L at the end of the career comes from the fall in basic research and the resulting effect on K. In Thursby and Thursby (2007) we consider the disclosure activity of a sample of 3342 faculty over as many as 17 years. For those faculty we find that disclosure activity (and hence, most likely licensing) rises early in a career only to fall in the final stages of the life cycle. Thus our empirical results support the theoretical results presented here.
To summarize, in this model licensing does indeed divert faculty from research over most of the career and the stock of knowledge K is generally lower with licensing. This detrimental effect follows from our narrow definition of research in which only basic effort adds to research output and the stock of knowledge. Note, however, that licensing leads faculty to work more over the career. Also, while research output and the stock of knowledge rise and then fall with licensing, the plots are flatter than without licensing. Toward the end of the career, research output with licensing is higher than without. Because this effect is late, however, the stock of knowledge suffers in the licensing regime (as compared to no licensing).
Complements Model
We now consider the case that one would expect to provide the most favorable view of licensing. In this case, the applied effort that is necessary for licensing also produces publishable research output so that it adds to the stock of knowledge, and it enters the faculty member's utility function. Basic and applied effort are complements in both the research and license production functions in the sense that an increase in either type of effort increases the marginal product of the other. The production functions are given by:
In the research function, we restrict the analysis to cases where, for the same amount of effort, basic has a higher marginal product than applied effort, or γ 1 > γ 2 . In the licensing function we assume the opposite in that the exponent of applied is larger than that of basic effort (α 1 > α 2 ). Figures 5 through 8 give life-cycle results in both the case of no licensing (s = 0) and licensing (s > 0). 1) Applied and basic effort are plotted in Figure 5 . Without licensing, basic effort is always greater than applied and both converge to values close to zero by the end of the career. This results from the assumption that γ 1 < γ 2 . With licensing, however, basic effort exceeds applied only in the early part of the career. It is important to note that even though the ratio of applied to basic effort increases (and exceeds one early on), basic effort throughout the career exceeds basic effort in the absence of licensing. This most likely occurs because basic and applied effort are complements in licensing as well as research. Also, and unlike the no licensing regime, applied and basic effort late in the life cycle converge to positive levels rather than zero at the end of the life-cycle. This is a result of the extra financial incentive associated with licensing.
2) As in the development case, leisure increases throughout the life cycle. Figure  6 shows that this pattern occurs regardless of the licensing regime, but the increase in leisure is much more dramatic in the no licensing regime. There is much less leisure in the presence of licensing, and the increase in leisure late in the career is modest.
3) In Figure 7 we plot the stock of knowledge and research output in the licensing and no licensing regimes. Because overall research effort is higher with licensing, there is necessarily greater research output and a higher stock of knowledge throughout the life cycle, though the differences are small until late in the career. Further, the life-cycle graphs are flatter under licensing; the fall in research and stock of knowledge is substantially sharper in the no licensing regime.
6) In Figure 8 we present licensing output when s > 0. Unlike the development case, there is no modest reduction in licensing output late in the career.
To summarize, the complements case presents a more favorable view of licensing than the development case. While the nature of research changes toward more applied effort, this effort is useful in both research and licensing and adds to the stock of knowledge. In the development case, research and the stock of knowledge suffered from licensing since applied effort did not contribute to the stock of knowledge. Also, there is less of a reduction in licensing output late in the career for the complements model than for the development model. Finally, to the extent that there is diversion away from basic effort, it is only a relative effect. In levels there is more of both basic and applied effort. To the extent that there is a meaningful diversion of faculty effort, it is a diversion away from leisure.
While not shown in the figures, an increase in the rate of depreciation δ of the knowledge base decreases the amount of basic and applied research in each period, and, as well, it decreases research output and the stock of knowledge. This result is consistent with earlier work on the obsolescence of knowledge and life cycle behavior and is independent of the licensing regime. 
Substitutes Model
A natural question to ask is how dependent these results are on the form of the production function. In particular, the suggestion from the empirical literature is that if basic and applied effort are substitutes rather than complements, licensing 5 See McDowell (1982) and Stephan and Levin (1992) . 13 might negatively affect the profile of research output and the stock of knowledge (Cohen et al. 1998) . To examine this, we consider life cycle behavior when the production function is given by
So that the only change in the model is in the research production function, we continue to assume the licensing production function is given by (13). Thus, while applied work does not improve the productivity of basic effort, basic effort can still be thought of as lying in the so-called Pastuer's Quadrant. We continue to restrict the analysis to cases where γ 1 > γ 2 and α 1 > α 2 .
Results are in Figures 9 to 12. There are only two meaningful differences in life-cycle behavior between the substitutes and complements models. First, basic effort is always higher than applied in the substitutes model regardless of the licensing regime.
6 Thus applied and basic effort need not be complements in the production of research in order for basic research to benefit from licensing. Second, there is a clear downturn in licensing output at the end of the career. Of greater importance are the similarities between the two models. Note that life-cycle behavior is essentially the same for the complements and substitutes models and that neither total research output nor the stock of knowledge suffer with licensing.
Tenure
So far we have abstracted from the incentives created by a system in which faculty obtain tenure seven years into the career cycle. In this section, we explore how a tenure system might affect research effort with licensing. The tenure system we envision is one in which the faculty member knows that basic research will be counted toward tenure, while applied work may not be counted toward it, and leisure surely is not. In the periods before the university makes the tenure decision, we assume that spending time on applied research and leisure increases the risk of not getting tenure, while engaging in basic research decreases the risk.
We model risk as the disutility associated with applied research and leisure before tenure. We use a simple time-varying coefficient of risk-aversion, η t , of the faculty member which can assume two values over her career: a positive value before the tenure decision at time d, t 6 d, and zero on tenure, i.e, t > d. Utility, U t , is a function of research output, R t , consumption of market goods, X t , leisure, n t , (dis)utility from risk-aversion, Φ t , and the net present value of assets at retirement, V (A T ). The faculty member's problem is to choose b t , a t , X t , n t , and A T to maximize the utility function given by:
where the disutility associated with risk is modeled as
Thus, the disutilty from risk-aversion is an increasing function of the researcher's coefficient of risk-aversion, η t , applied research, a t , leisure, n t , and a decreasing function of basic research, b t . A more risk-averse faculty member has a higher positive value of the coefficient of risk-aversion, and as a consequence, has a higher disutility from engaging in applied research and leisure before tenure. The coefficient of risk-aversion can vary across faculty members and varies over the life-cycle, depending on whether a faculty member is tenured or not. Thus, in our simplified model, we consider the effect of risk associated with the nature of research before tenure and not the risk associated with low research output since we continue to assume that all research output is publishable. Alternatively, we could attach a higher probability of publication to different types of research effort, or we could introduce a threshold of publications necessary to obtain tenure. 7 The second alternative would necessitate a more complicated production structure and should yield similar results since it would increase expected utility from basic research effort. The last alternative might well produce different results since the tenure decision would not distinguish between the types of research effort in awarding tenure.
To operationalize tenure in our simulations, we consider a simple time-varying coefficient of risk-aversion of the faculty member, assuming values of η t ∈(0.25, 0.50) before tenure decision (t 6 d), and η t = 0 for all periods after tenure (t > d), where the tenure decision is made at period d = 7.
Tenure in the Development Model
Consider again the model in which applied effort produces only license output and basic effort only affects licensing though the stock of knowledge. In Figures 13 through 16 we assume a tenure system is in effect and then examine how the introduction of a licensing regime affects life-cycle behavior.
8 Not surprisingly, there is a sharp change in behavior pre-tenure versus post-tenure. With or without licensing, basic effort is much higher before than after tenure, while leisure is much lower before tenure than after. In the licensing regime, applied research is relatively lower before tenure than after.
In a tenure world, the introduction of licensing has a positive effect on the level of basic effort (see Figure 13) throughout the life cycle, although this effect is more dramatic before the tenure year than after. This relatively large increase in basic effort early in the career leads to higher research output and a higher stock of knowledge with licensing than without (See Figure 15) . This, of course, is in contrast to our results in the absence of tenure where the introduction of licensing reduced basic effort, research output, and the stock of knowledge over much of the life cycle. The difference comes from the substantial boost that tenure gives to basic effort early on. This in turn, leads to a higher stock of knowledge which carries forward through the remainder of the career.
The results for applied effort and leisure with tenure are similar to those in the absence of tenure, with the exception that the increase in applied effort that results from licensing is relatively larger after the tenure year. Finally, in Figure  16 we again see a fall in licensing output late in the career. Also, the fact that licensing induces applied effort, in combination with the inducement for basic effort in a tenure system leads to a jump in licensing output at the time of tenure. In Thursby and Thursby (2007) we found not only a fall in disclosure activity late in the career but also a rise early in the career. This pattern observed in the data is consistent with the life-cycle pattern observed here.
In summary, tenure leads to an abrupt change in life-cycle behavior at the time of tenure, but post-tenure life-cycle behavior is similar in form to what we observed in the absence of tenure with one very important difference. Licensing in a nontenure world for the development model had a negative effect on research; in a tenure regime, the effect of licensing is positive.
Tenure in the Complements Model
Figures 17 through 21 present the plots for the complements model with a tenure system. As with the development model, we observe a sharp change in behavior pre-tenure versus post tenure. However, as is evident in Figure 17 , the boost that a tenure system gives to basic effort (and hence the stock of knowledge) early in the career is greatest in the absence of licensing. Post tenure, both applied and basic effort are higher in a licensing regime, but the early effect on the stock of knowledge leads to higher research in a non-licensing regime.
Interpreting these results is difficult because of the offsetting effects involved. There is an increased incentive for basic effort in the first six years with a tenure system. Because of the complementarity of basic and applied effort in both production and licensing, the introduction of licensing increases the incentive for both types of effort (hence the reduction in leisure), but the impact depends on the exponents in the production functions, as well as the share of revenue accruing to the faculty member.
To better understand these effects, we separated our results into those with low and high incentives to license. Figure 21 plots applied effort for three cases: no licensing, licensing with s < 0.5, α 1 ≤ 0.4, and α 2 < 0.5, and licensing with s ≥ 0.5, α 1 ≥ 0.6, and α 2 ≥ 0.5. As expected, applied effort is highest in the regime with higher shares and productivity of effort in licensing. However, as shown in Figure 22 , the impact of licensing on basic effort is nonlinear. Prior to the tenure year, basic effort is highest without licensing and lowest with high license incentives. In the middle of her career (i.e., after tenure until late in the career), basic effort is highest for positive but relatively low shares and license productivity and lowest without licensing. Late in the career, basic effort is highest for the high license incentives. Figure 23 plots research output for the three cases. Until very late in the career, research output is highest in the licensing regime with low values of s and α i , and it is lowest in the licensing regime with high values of s and α i .This means that licensing improves research output when the returns are positive but relatively low, but it compromises research output over much of the life cycle when the returns are very high. The reason for this is that tenure boosts basic effort prior to the tenure year much more when s, and α i are low or equal to zero than when s and α i are high. The relative high levels of basic effort early in the career with low or zero s and α i yield relatively higher stocks of knowledge, so that basic and applied efforts are more productive in those cases after tenure.
Thus licensing in a tenure world increases basic effort for much of the career as long as the financial incentives are not too high. This result is interesting in light of Jensen et al.'s (2003) finding that faculty shares of royalty income are indeed lower in US universities with higher quality faculty (as measured by the National Research Council rankings of PhD granting departments). In their work, admin-istrators set the shares of license income accruing to faculty and the technology transfer office (TTO) in a principal agent model with the administrator as the principal and the TTO and faculty as agents. Utility in their model is a function only of revenue, so diversion of faculty from research is not an issue to administrators. Our results suggest a new implication of their empirical result; that is, perhaps administrators in top universities (as defined by the NRC) have been wise in their choices.
Concluding Remarks
An important issue in the debates over university licensing is whether the associated financial incentives compromise the research mission of the university by diverting faculty from basic research. In this paper, we argue that understanding the effects of licensing on research requires an understanding of faculty motives in conducting research and how they vary over the life cycle. We construct several life cycle models of faculty behavior that take into account both the puzzle solving and financial motives for faculty to conduct research. In the models we consider, the faculty member faces a fixed teaching load and chooses the amount of time to devote to research (which can be either basic or applied) and the amount of time to take as leisure. We consider her behavior with and without the possibility of licensing. This allows us to examine the effect of licensing on the research mix, as well as the total amount of time working, throughout the life cycle.
We show that, with or without licensing, and regardless of the research production functions considered, faculty devote more time to research early in their career, so that leisure rises over time. In that sense, licensing does not alter life cycle patterns. There are, nonetheless, real effects of licensing since it yields a higher ratio of applied to basic effort and lower leisure throughout the life cycle. Thus, as suggested by Lach and Schankerman (2003) , faculty respond to economic incentives This is not to say, however, that licensing compromises research effort. In our models, leisure is the activity most compromised, so that total research effort rises; and in most of the models we consider, basic effort rises with the introduction of licensing.
The implications of licensing for research output and the stock of knowledge depend on the model specification. The worst case scenario is of course the development model without tenure because in this case applied effort adds nothing to the stock of knowledge. In this case, research output suffers from the introduction of licensing. If, however, the applied effort involved in licensing leads to publish-able output as well as licenses, then the outlook is more favorable. In these cases, research output and the stock of knowledge are generally higher with licensing than without. Interestingly, this result is not dependent on the assumption that basic and applied effort are complements in production. It stems, rather, from the fact that applied effort contributes to the stock of knowledge and the complementarity of basic and applied effort and the stock of knowledge in the license production function. Finally, the only negative effect of licensing in these cases is with a tenure system when the incentives to license are extremely high.
Several limitations of the analysis should be noted. First, our production functions represent output in terms of numbers of publications and licenses. Another limitation is that the analysis relies on simulations with particular functional forms and parameter values. Further, it is important to note that the results presented are based on averages across parameter values.
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